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Summary:
This paper develops a dynamic computational bioeconomic model with the objective of assessing
protected marine reserves as fisheries management tools. Data on the North East Atlantic cod stock
are used to determine the bioeconomically optimal size of a marine reserve for the Barents Sea cod
fishery, as a function of the net transfer rate between the protected and unprotected areas of the
marine habitat. The single agent model developed, allows for the occurrence of a shock to the
system in the form of severe recruitment faIlure in the non-protected area. Two key results emerge
from the study. First, establishment of marine reserves are bioeconomically beneficial when net
transfer rates for cod are "reasonably" high and reserve sizes are large: Large reserves provide good
protection for the stock in the face of the shock, whIle high transfer rates make the protected fish
available for harve sting after the shock has occurred. Further, optimally chosen reserve size when
net transfer rates are high, also mitigates against biological losses. Second, when net transfer rates
are low, the establishment of marine reserves does not mitigate against losses in discounted
economic rent, whIle they tend to be efficient in mitigating against biologicallosses.
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Economic models
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to address the gains and losses in economic rent, catches, and
standing biomass that may result from the establishment of protected marine reserves
(PMRs), defined as no-fishing zones. Increasingly no-fishing zones are seen as useful
fisheries management tools in the face of disappointments with present management
practices. Generally, the establishment of PMRs has been promoted as a viable alternative
when other forms of fisheries management are impracticable or unsuccessful (see for
instance, Wallis 1971; Davis, 1981; Bohnsack, 1990). Bohnsack (1990) gives a
comprehensive list of the potential benefits that may be expected from the establishment
of marine reserves, including (i) protection of spawning biomass, (ii) providing a
recruitment source for surrounding areas, (iii) supplemental restocking of fished are as
through emigration, (iv) maintenance of natural population age structure, (v) maintenance
of are as of undisturbed habitat, and (vi) insurance against management failures in fished
areas.
To realize any, or all, of the potential benefits listed above, biologists argue that PMRs
must be designed appropriately: location, size and shape of the reserve must be chosen to
reflect the realities of the habitat and the fishes to be protected (see for example Rowley,
1994). A number of scientists have looked at the question of the optimal size of protected
marine reserves from both the biological and the mitigation of the effects of uncertainty
perspectives. Polacheck (1990), Quinn et al. (1993) and Man et al. (1995), all come to the
conclusion that for the effects of protection to be realized, a reserve must be about 50% of
the habitat. Lauck et al., (in press) suggest that the negative impacts of uncertainty may be
2
mitigated if large parts of the fish population (at least 50%) is protected completely from
exploitation. The current paper extends past studies by exploring optimal bioeconomic
marine reserve size in the face of a shock to the system. This effort is a follow up to
Sumaila (in press), where the case for the inclusion of social and economic variables in
the assessment of marines reserve as a fisheries management to ol is made.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I present the model,
which consists of two parts: A main model that describes the dynamics in the fished area,
and a subsidiary one which does the same for the protected area. The two parts are linked
through a net transfer rate function. In section 3, the results of the study are stated, the
main highlight of which is that optimal PMR size is zero in a single agent bioeconomic
model when the net transfer rate is low. However, when net transfer rates are high, the
optimal size is positive. Section 4 discusses the results of the study and concludes the
paper.
2. The model
The analysis focuses on the Barents Sea cod fishery in quasi-empirical manner, but it
could be replicated for any fishery for which the necessary data are avaIlable. The Barents
Sea cod stock is controlled by Norway and Russia, both of which have legitimate claims
to fishing rights to the stock. Let us assume that both countries have the objective of
managing the resource in a bioeconomically efficient manner. They recognize the need to
cooperate so as to eliminate all common property problems, and so get rid of both
biological and economic waste of the resource. This implies that given full and perfect
3
information about the fishery, these countries would deploy the exact amount of fishing
effort every year to ensure them maximum discounted economic rent from the resource,
without destroying the resource base. Indeed, management of the Barents Sea cod has
been characterized by cooperation between Norway and Russia over the years: Total
allowable catches are determined annually based on work carried out by scientists from
the two countries, and allocation decisions made by a mixed Norwegian-Russian
Commission (Nakken et al., 1996).
Being realistic rational agents, the countries recognize that to have full and perfect
information about the fishery is but a dream because of true uncertainty (see Lauck et aL.,
in press; SumaIla, in press). In furtherance of the ongoing cooperation between the two
countries, and as a way to mitigate the negative impacts of the inadequacy of information
available, the countries consider the establishment of protected marine reserves. The key
question then is, what is the bioeconomically optimal size of the proposed PMR? This is
the main question addressed in this paper.
2.1 Recruitment of cod to the habitat
Let recruitment of age O fish to the whole habitat in period t (t=1.T), Rt, be represented
by the following Beverton-Holt recruitment function. This function is chosen because
recent biological studies have shown that it is more realistic than the Ricker recruitment
function (Guenette and Pitcher, pers. Comm.),
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(1)
R (B ) _ aBHt H - 1 + ì1H
where Bt_1 = LPaws,ana,t-l represents the post-catch spawning biomass of fish II
a
weight; Pa is the proportion of mature fish of age a (a=1.A); w",a is the weight at
spawning of fish of age a; na,i-i is the post-catch number of age a fish in period t-l; and ex
and 'Y are constant biological parameters. The values of ex and 'Y determine the amount of
recruitment into the habitat for a given spawning biomass, which in turn determines the
pris tine stock leve! in a deterministic mode!.
2.1.1 Modeling protected areas
To establish reserves in the model, the following assumptions are made, (i) initially, the
stock and recruits are homogeneously distributed, and randomly dispersed at a constant
density, (ii) the fish population in the habitat can be split into two distinct components, i
= 1,2 where 1 and 2 denote the protected and unprotected areas, respectively, and (iii)
there is net movement from the protected to the unprotected area, because presumably
fish density is high relative to the caring capacity in the protected compartment (see the
Basin model, MacCall, 1990). This movement is captured by a biological function known
as the net transfer rate, which tells us the net proportion of a given age group of fish that
is transferred from the protected to the unprotected area in a given fishing period. Note
that the net transfer rate is a biological characteristic of the stock studied. There are a
number of biological studies that have attempted to model the transfer rate for particular
fisheries (see for example, Polacheck, 1990). In this study attempts are not made to
5
determine a particular net transfer rate for cod, rather results for a set of transfer rates are
produced, and the reserve size that gives the best bioeconomIc outcome for each of these
are determIned.
2.1.2 Dividing habitat into protected and unprotected areas
Three things are done in order to divide the habitat into protected and unprotected areas.
First, the initial stock size in the habitat, as a whole, is divided between the protected and
unprotected areas in proportion to their respective sizes. Hence, a size of PMR of 30% of
the habitat, results in a split of the initial stock size into a 3:7 ratio in favor of the
unprotected area. Second, recruitment into the two areas are separated and defined as in
Bi iequation 1 above, each area with its own t-l and r , i=1,2. The a parameter, being an
intrinsic element of the stock under consideration, is kept constant both for the fish in the
reserve and those in the fished area. Third, the respective 'Y parameters are set such that
(i) the sum of recruitment from both areas satisfy
(2)
Rtl + Rt2 = Rt for B;_i + Bt2_i = Bt_i
and (ii) the recruitment into the protected and unprotected areas is directly related to the
i
quantity of the total biomass in them. These conditions are enforced by giving r values
dependent on the reserve size.
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2.2 The stock dynamics
1
For the protected area, let the stock dynamics of the biomass of fish in numbers, na,t, be
described by
(3)
i RI
nO,t = t'
i I I
na,t + lfna,t = sna_l,_1 , for O -( a -( A,
n~,t +i¡~,t = s(n~_I,t_1 +n~,t_I)' n~,o given.
where the parameter s is the natural survival probabilty of cod, assumed to be age
i
independent; lfna,t is the net transfer function through emigration from the protected to
i
the unprotected area of age a cod in period t, and lf is a fraction; na,o denotes the initial
stock leve! in the protected area, which is a fraction (equal to size of reserve) of the initial
stock leve! in the habitat. It should be noted that there is no direct harve sting of cod in the
reserve.
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The stock dynamics in the unprotected area may be expressed as
(4)
2 R2
nO,t = t'
2 h2 2 I
na,t + a,t = sna_l,t_1 + 1la,t' for O -( a -( A,
2 h2 ( 2 2) In A,t + A,t = S n A-I,t-l + n A-l,t + 1l A,t ' n~,O given.
where h~,t = aan~,tet is the harvest function; aa is the age dependent catchability
coefficient, et, is the effort employed in the exploitation of cod in period t.
2.3 A shock to the system
The shock introduced herein is due to what is described in the literature as true
uncertainty (see Lauck, et al., in press; Walters and HIlborn, 1978). By definition true
uncertainty is difficult to mode!, as it comes in the form of an unexpected disaster, or
catastrophe, with a huge negative impact. True uncertainty is introduced here in a simple
manner: The occurrence of a shock to the system is added to the otherwise deterministic
mode!. The paricular shock incorporated is a recruitment faIlure (zero recruitment) that
occurs in years 5 to 15 (inclusive) ofthe 28 year-time horizon mode!. An important point
to note here is that the shock is assumed to occur only in the fished area, an assumption
which follows Lauck et aL., (in press), where true uncertainty is assumed to occur because
of human intervention (based on imperfect information) in the natural environment,
which leads to both unintended over-fishing and habitat degradation. The reader may
want to compare the use of uncertainty here with its use in other papers in this volume.
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A variety of possible shocks could have been introduced in the model, the particular
shock introduced would be expected to have at least some quantitative effects on the
results of the analysis. In designing the shock in this model, the aim was to get something
dramatic enough to capture the concerns of the analysis. After all, true or sec ond degree
uncertainty is concerned with dramatic shocks such as the one which led to the
suspension of commercial fishing in Atlantic Canada's cod fishery since 1992. Anyhow,
sensitivity analysis allowing a less dramatic shock to the system is performed to
investigate the consequences of such changes to the results of the study.
2.4 Management objective
In terms of management, the net transfer rate is a biological characteristic of the stock
being studied, whIle PMR size, and sizeofcatch (or equivalently effort leve!) are choice
variables for management. The objective of the co operative owners is to find a sequence
of effort leveIs, ei (t = 1,2,...,T=28) to maximize the discounted economic rent from the
resource for given PMR sizes, as a function of the net transfer rate. That is, maximize
(5)
II(n2 ,e) = fôl(v i. waqan~,tet -~(et)l+bJ
t=1 a=O 1 +b
with respect to the effort leve! given the size of the PMR, and subject to (i) equation (3),
(ii) equation (4), and (iii) the necessar non-negativity constraints. It should be noted that
maximization is carring out under full information in the face of a shock to the system.
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In equation (5) above, Ô = (1 + r t is the discount factor, and r denotes the interest rate;
n2 is the age and time dependent stock size matrix in the fished area; v is the price per unit
weight of cod; Wa is the average weight of age a cod; k is a cost parameter, and b-;O is a
parameter introduced to en sure strict concavity in the mode!, which is required to ensure
convergence in the model (see Sumaila, 1997). It should be noted that the cost function in
(5) is independent of the size of the reserve. This is a simplification as one would expect
harvesting co st to be directly related to the size of the reserve due to factors such as the
effects of congestion on harvesting activities. On the other hand, one can also argue that
given the current state of fishing technology, it is possible to land fish at unit costs that
are space-independent.
The following modified Lagrangian function can be set up for the problem expressed in
equation (5) (see SumaIla, 1997).
(6)
L(nl ,n2 ,e, y) = II(n2 ,e)
Y¿,t (Ri - n¿,i r + Y~,i (Ri2 - n~,t r +
T
+ L Y~,t(sn~-i,i- +n~_l,)-n~,t -1f~,ir + Y~,t(sn~-i,i-i +n~_l,)+If~,1 -n~,t -h~,tr
t=l
A-I A-I
+ L y~,isn~-i,t- - n~,t - i¡Jn~,t r + L(y;"sn;-I,t-l + 1f~,i - n;,t - h;" ra=1 a=l
where the variable y is a modified Lagrange multiplier; a "negative" superscript to a
bracket, (.r, refers to the min(O,(.)) and all other variables and parameters are as defined
earlier.
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The solution to the problem at hand is pursued numerically using a procedure from non-
smooth convex optimization (Flåm 1993). The computational novelty here lies in the fact
that two separate but linked models are simulated: A main model capturing the dynamics
in the fished area, and a co-model that captures the dynamics in the protected area. The
two models are run in paralleI, linked through the net transfer rate function.
3. The results
3.1 Data
The parameters ex and 'Y are set equal to 1.5 and 1 per bilion kilograms, respectively, to
give a bilion zero age fish when the spawning biomass is two milion tons. Based on the
survival rate of cod, s is given a value of 0.81 for all a. The price, v= NOK 6.78, is
assumed to be constant and age independent. The co st parameter k, which denotes the
cost of engaging a trawl vessel for one year, is ca1culated to be NOK 21 milion (see
Sumaila, in press) The discount factor is given a value of 0.98 to reflect the current low
leve! of interest rates. The initial number of cod of age groups 1 to 8 are obtained by
taking the average of the initial numbers from 1984 to 1991 reported in Table 3.12
of the ICES (1992). Forthe other age groups we assume the same number as for age
group 8. This gives (460,337,298,223,117,61,33,9,9,9,9,9,9,9,9) for a=1.l5, resulting in
an estimated initial stock size of 2.24 milion tons. The parameter Pa=O for aoe7 and
1 otherwse; q,=0 for aoe5 and 0.074 otherwse; wa =
(0.1,0.3,0.6,1.0,1.4,1.83,2.26,3.27,4.27,5.78, 7.96,9. 79,11.53,13.84,15.2
4,16.34) for a=O..15; and ws,a is assumed to be 90% ofwa (see Sumaila,
1995).
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3.2 Discounted economic rent
First, the results for an experimental scenario, where no PMR is in force in the presence
of a shock to the system (denoted "Expt"), and a control scenario, where there is no shock
and no PMR in force, are presented. For the control scenario, a discounted economic rent
of NOK 109.29 bilion is computed, while NOK 53.79 billon discounted economic rent
is obtained in the case of the experimental scenario. Thus, over 50% of the possible
economic benefits from the resource are lost as a res ult of the shock to the system. These
two outcomes are the base case scenarios with which comparison would be made with the
outcomes for scenarios in which PMRs are in force.
The discounted economic rent obtained for different reserve sizes (ranging from 0.1 to
0.7), and for different net transfer rates (ranging from 0.1 to 0.6) are reported in Table 1.
The maximum net transfer rate of 0.6 is chosen based on the fact that a demersal species
such as cod is not expected to have too high net transfer rates. Similarly, the maximum
PMR size of 0.7 is selected because size of PMR of over 0.7 of habitat is considered to be
unrealistic, especially because dependency of harvesting cost on PMR size is not
modelled in this paper. Also the fact that it is implicitly assumed that the number of fish
transferred from the reserve to the exploited area increases with the size of the reserve,
makes higher reserve sizes unrealistic.
To read Table 1 start from the first column and select a paricular net transfer rate, then
read across the row for this net transfer rate and identify the highest figure in the row.
Now, pick out the reserve size that corresponds to this and that is the PMR size that gives
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the highest discounted economic rent for the chosen net transfer rate. For instance, for a
net transfer rate of 0.3, the highest economic rent achievable is NOK 49.93,
corresponding to PMR size equal to 0.1. A point to note from Table L is that the rent
reported is not unimodal as would be expected. A possible reason for this is the complex
nature of how the transfer rate, reserve size, recruitment, etc., interact with each other in
the mode!.
A comparison of the payoff of NOK 53. 79 achieved under the experimental regime, with
the highest payoffs for each of the possible net transfer rates in Table 1 shows that
economically, optimal PMR size is O for net transfer rates ranging from 0.1 to 0.3. This
means that for low net transfer rates, the cooperative agents are better off without creating
a protected marine reserve. On the other hand, we see that for high net transfer rates (0.4 -
0.6), the optimal PMR size jumps to as high as 0.7. This means that the establishment of
marine reserves in this model mitigates against economic loss only if cod is a fast mover.
The two results stated above are ilustrated more c1early in Figure i. In this figure,
discounted economic rents are plotted against PMR size for each possible net transfer rate
inc1uding the experimental case. From the figure we see that a comparison of the plot for
the scenario where no PMR is created, shows that the establishment of PMR is
economically beneficial only for a combination of high transfer rates (0.4 - 0.6) and large
reserve sizes (0.4 - 0.7).
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3.3 Stock level
Figure il shows that the establishment of a PMR in the face of a shock to the system is
c1early biologically beneficial: In all cases and throughout the time horizon of the mode!,
the plotted stock profies are higher than for the experimental scenario. Also, at the
terminal period, lower stock of fish is left in the experimental case. It is worth mentioning
at this juncture tha.t the fishing pressure indicated by the stock and harvest profies during
the last periods of the game is mainly because of the fact that the end of the game is
approaching: Hence, the fishers are trying to do their best before the arrival of the
"domsday". These results are further ilustrated by Figure il, which plots the average
stock and harvest levels for different scenarios. A comparison of the average stock levels
in the presence and absence of a reserve, shows that their establishment acts as a hedge
against biologicallosses in the face of a shock to the system.
Another point to note from Figure il is that, for the same reserve size, higher net transfer
rates for the same (reserve) size results in lower average standing biomass (compare the
bars for TR4SH with those for TR6SH, where in each case reserve size is 0.7). On the
other hand, higher net transfer rates imply higher harvests, and thus higher economic
benefits. Clearly, at some point there is an inevitable trade-off between biological and
economic benefits of marine reserves, an issue discussed later in this section of the paper.
3.4 Catch level
Figures il and IV demonstrates the effects of the establishment of marine reserves on the
harvest leveIs. We can conclude from these figures that high net transfer rates are
14
important for ensuring minimal or no losses in harvest leve!s with the creation of marine
reserves.
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
With respect to sensitivity, the most important assumption of the study is that related to
the shock introduced in the mode!. To test how sensitive the results are to the dramatic
recruitment failure in years 5 to 15 assumed in the base scenario, the model is re-run with
a milder recruitment failure, which occurs only in years 4 to 8 of the 28 year time horizon
mode!. Two observations were made. First, as expected, the need for no-fishing zones
both in terms of economics and biology reduces when a less dramatic shock is
incorporated. Second, the importance of high net transfer rates, for makng the
establishment of PMRs economically defensible, is further reinforced with a milder
shock.
The effects of changes in economic parameters such as the discount factor and net price
per unit weight of fish landed reported in Holland and Brazee (1996) are valid here. That
is, an increase in the discount factor wil tend to increase the optimal size of marine
reserve required. Also, increasing net real price of fish over time wil support larger
optimal reserve size than for constant or decreasing net prices.
3.6 Economic and biological gains: An analysis of trade-offs
Apart from determining the optimal size of marine reserves for a given fishery, studies of
this nature can help make c1ear trade-offs between biological and economic concerns
related to their establishment. It should be noted that throughout this paper, stock size and
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discounted economic rent are taken to be the indicators of biological and (bi o )economic
health of the fishery, respectively. To discuss these trade-offs, let us assume that the net
transfer rate for cod has been determined to be 0.2. For this net transfer rate, Figure V
plots average standing stock sizes, a biological safety index, and discounted economic
rents, against reserve size. Following the way price indices are defined (Gordon, 1986,
chapter 2), the index of biological safety is defined as, ave rage standing spawning
biomass less minimum safe level of spawning biomass, divided by minimum safe level of
spawning biomass. This definition implîes that the larger the index the more biologically
safe the stock, or conversely, the lower the index the more risk the stock faces.
Russian and Norwegian scientists have come to the conclusion that the minimum safe
leve! of spawning biomass for the North East Atlantic cod is 0.5 million tons (Jakobsen,
1993; Serebryakov, 1991). Using this information and the spawning biomass computed,
indices of biological safety for the different scenarios are calculated and used to plot
Figure V.
From Figure V, it is seen that as reserve size increases from O to 0.7, economic rent
decreases from 53.79 to 38.87 bilion NOK. However, the average stock size increases
from 1.6 to 3.09 million tons. Furthermore, the figure shows that the larger the reserve
size the more biologically safe the stock. Thus, the more safe we want the stock to be
(into the future) the less economic benefit we can achieve now.
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The question facing management therefore is, how much biological safety is it wiling to
trade-off for more current economic benefits, and vice versa? The answer to this question
would depend on how risk averse management is: A very risk avers e management would
go for a reserve size of 0.7, accepting a discounted economic rent of NOK 38.87 bilion
and maintaining a high safety index of 1.72. An index of 1.72 means that a spawning
biomass of 1.72 times the required minimum is maintained On the other hand, a risk
loving management would choose a reserve size of zero (or 0.1), accepting a low safety
index of 0.6 (0.7), in order to make a discounted economic rent of NOK 53.79 (49.53)
bilion.
4. Discussion and conclusion
Results from studies that focus on the problem of uncertainty suggest that large reserves
have the potential to mitigate the negative impacts of true uncertainty (Lauck, et al., in
press). From the bioeconomic perspective, the current study supports this results for a
model that incorporates a shock to the system, but only in the case of fast moving fish. In
terms of hedging against biologicallosses, however, this study supports the results of
Lauck et al. in press, without reservation.
The results from previous biological studies of marine reserves can be summarized in the
following three points (see Guenette et al., in press for a review). The establishment of
marine reserves wil result in (i) an increase in the spawning biomass, (ii) a decrease in
the fishery yield or harest, and (iii) movement of fish out of the reserve could negate its
benefit. It should be noted that these results fit reasonably well with those of the current
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study, especially if we consider the fact that the studies cited are biological studies of
fisheries where over-exploitation is the main concern: In a single agent model of the type
developed herein, "delibrate" over-exploitation is not a problem.
As modeling and computations are exercises in succes sive approximation, there are a
number of aspects of the current study that can to be improved upon. First, the transfer
rate function is assumed to be proportional to the size of the protected stock. This is
c1early simplistic as the size of a reserve wil impact on how much of the fish in the
protected area wil be transferred to the fished area. In addition, the way it is modelled,
the productivity of the stock increases with the size of the reserve, which might not be
realistic at low transfer rates, since the reserve compartment might increase to near
caring capacity with no room for further recruitment.
I see the proportionality assumption as an economist s simplification of the biological
processes involved and a challenge to biologists to develop more realistic transfer rate
functions, as these are crucial to any analyses of the potential benefits of marine reserves.
The current study produces preliminary results that, I hope, wil stimulate fisheries
researchers (biologists, economists and other social scientists) to look deeper into a line
of research which wil became increasingly more important as we strive to tind better
ways to exploit the world's fishery resources sustainability.
In addition to the modeling of the transfer rate function, I can foresee at least three
possible improvements and extensions to the current analysis. First, an extension of the
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model to make it multi-agent and non-cooperative should provide interesting insights
because then, it would be possible to explore the effects of non-cooperation on the
bioeconomic usefulness of protected marine reserves. Second, an improvement in the cost
function used in this analysis could be achieved by remodeling it to make it dependent on
the size of the reserve. Third, introduction of stochasticity in the model wil be auseful
extension, as this wil make it a true model of uncertainty.
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Plots discounted economic rent (in bilion NOK) against PMR size for
each possible net transfer rate, and the experimental scenario.
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Plots the stock profies (in millon tons) for the control, experimental
(Expt), and those that give the highest economic benefits for net
transfer rates equal to 0.1 with PMR size = 0.1 (TRIS); 0.3 with PMR
size = 0.1 (TR3S); and 0.5 with PMR size = 0.7 (TR5S).
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Figure IlL. Plots the average stock and harest levels (in millon tons) for the
control, experimental (Expt), and those that give the highest economic
benefits for net transfer rates equal to 0.2 with PMR size = 0.1
(TR2SH); 0.4 with PMR size = 0.7 (TR4SH); and 0.6 with PMR size =
0.7 (TR6SH).
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Fžgure IV Plots the harvest profiles (in millon tons) for the control, experimental
(Expt), and those that give the highest economic benefits for net
transfer rates equal to 0.1 with PMR size = 0.1 (TRIH); 0.3 with PMR
size = 0.1 (TR3H); and 0.5 with PMR size = 0.7 (TR5H).
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Figure V Plots average standing stock sizes (in billon tons), biological safety
index and discounted economic rents (in 10's of bilion NOK), against
reserve size for net transfer rate of 0.2.
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Table I: Presents discounted economic rent (in bilion NOK) obtained as
a function of both PMR size and the net transfer rate.
, PMR-size
TransRate 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.1 48.25 42.38 39.06 35.3 30.64 26.39 28.23
0.2 49.53 44.58 42.27 40.33 36.66 35.1 38.87
0.3 49.93 47.55 45.37 43.47 40.69 41.33 45.53
0.4 50.25 48.22 47.96 46.36 44.49 50.26 55.52
0.5 51.25 50.14 50.91 49.72 50.49 57.27 65.94
0.6 52.69 51.8 54.91 54.06 58.04 63.67 68.64
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